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The present paper uses data from revolving credit card securitizations to show that, 
conditional on being in a position where implicit recourse has become necessary and 
actually providing that recourse, recourse to securitized debt may benefit short- and long-
term stock returns, and long-term operating performance of sponsors. The paper suggests 
that this result may come about because those sponsors providing the recourse do not seem 
to be extreme default or insolvency risks. However, sponsors providing recourse do 
experience an abnormal delay in their normal issuance cycle around the event. Hence, it 
appears that the asset-backed securities market is like the commercial paper market, where a 
firm’s ability to issue is directly correlated with credit quality. Therefore, although in 
violation of regulatory guidelines and FASB140, recourse may have beneficial effects for 
sponsors by revealing that the shocks that made recourse necessary are transitory. 
  
Commercial banks have a strong incentive to sell assets in order to increase liquidity, 
reduce interest rate risk, and avoid burdensome regulations. However, most bank assets are high 
asymmetric information financial instruments and, as a result, are fundamentally illiquid. Hence, 
commercial banks have become increasingly reliant upon securitization as a means of selling 
assets.  
Business strategies that revolve around securitization are accompanied by a host of 
incentive conflicts. At various times during the 1990s, securitization has been associated with 
financial difficulties arising from fictitious financial ratios (gain-on-sale provisions), understated 
leverage (Enron), and hidden risks (Enron, PNC, and other commercial banks). The present 
paper concerns itself with the last of these, that is, the propensity for securitizations to mask risks 
to the sponsor,
1 whether the sponsor is a bank originating loans or a nonbank firm posting other 
collateral for securitization (Calomiris and Mason 2003; Jones 2000).  
Risks often remain with the sponsor because securitization – and the removal of assets 
from the sponsor’s balance sheet – relies on a “true sale” to a legally remote third party. If the 
assets are not truly sold or the sale is not to a legally defined third party, the assets must be 
reported on the sponsor’s balance sheet. One important condition that determines whether a true 
sale has taken place is whether the sale agreement provides recourse, or performance guarantees, 
to the buyer. If recourse terms are present, the assets pose a contingent risk to the seller which, 
under FASB140, prohibits the removal of the assets from the seller’s balance sheet.  
While few loan sales contracts contain explicit terms that provide recourse, many loan 
sales (particularly those involving revolving collateral like credit card loans) hinge upon an 
implicit understanding that recourse may be provided by the sponsor. Such understandings exist 
                                                 
1 The sponsor originates the assets and sells them to a bankruptcy-remote third-party trust that funds the purchase by 
issuing asset-backed securities. 
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because sponsors wish to maintain their reputations for consistent credit quality over repeated 
sales (while still taking advantage of the ability, under a true sale, to remove the assets from the 
balance sheet). Losing a good reputation (and the ability to sell loans economically) may expose 
the sponsor to decreased liquidity, increased interest rate risk, and burdensome regulatory 
supervision.  
By providing recourse in cases where none is explicitly required, the sponsor demonstrates 
the presence of de facto recourse and therefore previously unreported contingent liabilities. The 
present paper examines the effects of these revelations on the sponsor. On the face of it, one 
might expect that revealing previously unreported contingent liabilities could heighten 
asymmetric information about firm conditions, resulting in poor short- and long-term stock price 
performance, poor long-term financial performance, and reduced proceeds from subsequent loan 
sales. However, we find that, conditional on being in a position where honoring implicit 
recourse has become necessary and conditional on actually providing that recourse, the 
sponsors, on average, exhibit improved short- and long-term stock price performance, improved 
long-term financial performance, and similar proceeds from subsequent loan sales.  
The rest of the paper proceeds by describing in Section I the choice of credit card banks for 
this study of recourse, the sample of credit card banks used, the recourse events that have taken 
place in the history of credit card securitization, and the recourse credit card bank sample 
analyzed throughout the paper. Section II examines short-term stock price effects around 
recourse announcements for recourse announcing firms and non-recourse announcing firms. 
Section III examines long-term stock price and financial performance around recourse 
announcements. Section IV examines the riskiness of sponsors that provide recourse. Section V 
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examines subsequent loan sale proceeds and provisions around recourse announcements. Section 
VI summarizes and concludes.  
I. Credit Card Banks and Implicit Recourse 
A. Why credit card banks? 
There are four key stages of the securitization process.
2 First, the sponsor sells a collateral 
pool to a bankruptcy-remote third-party trust or special purpose entity (SPE). In this step, the 
sale to the bankruptcy-remote third-party – the “true sale” – is crucial to removing the collateral 
from the sponsor’s balance sheet in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP – FASB 140) and regulatory accounting principles (RAP). Both GAAP and RAP 
stipulate that in the event a true sale is deemed to have not occurred, that is, if the third party is 
not bankruptcy remote or if the sponsor maintains control over the assets, the collateral must 
revert to the sponsor’s balance sheet. 
Second, the SPE hires an investment bank to engineer tranches of debt securities and 
underwrite the sale of the securities. Before the tranche structure is complete, it is stress-tested 
by one or more ratings agencies to certify the investment quality of the securities. After 
certification is complete the investment bank sells the issue to investors. 
Third, the securitization enters the revolving stage, lasting anywhere from two to 10 years 
(sometimes more in the case of collateral other than credit cards). During this period a constant 
pool size is maintained by the SPE, from which interest and principal payments may be passed 
along to investors monthly. With short-term collateral like credit cards, principal collected during 
this stage is used to purchase additional receivables from the sponsor and replenish the investors’ 
portfolio. Since the sponsor and SPE have a bankruptcy-remote third-party relationship, the 
                                                 
2 For additional background, see the ABC’s of Credit Card ABS and Moody’s 1997. 
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sponsor is expected to sell receivables to the SPE at par value, if not (higher) market value. 
Selling below par is usually taken as evidence that the sponsor is controlling the trust and hence 
a true sale has not in fact taken place. Under GAAP and RAP, therefore, the collateral should 
revert to the sponsor’s balance sheet. 
Last, the securitization enters the amortization phase. During the amortization phase 
principal payments are either accumulated into a pool that will be used to repay investor 
principal upon a stated date or distributed to investors with monthly coupon payments across a 
stipulated time period (usually one year). Amortization may occur as originally planned in the 
securities prospectus or earlier. The latter is referred to as early amortization. Early amortization 
is an investor remedy that is imposed if the collateral does not perform in a manner that could 
reasonably be expected to support payments of principal and interest to investors. Typical 
portfolio events that lead to early amortization in credit card securitizations are increased 
chargeoffs, decreased payment rates, and reduced portfolio yield. The purpose of early 
amortization is to repay investors before these events lead to loss of principal.  
In the event of early amortization, the SPE will no longer be able to purchase new 
collateral from the sponsor. Hence the sponsor must either accept new collateral on-balance-
sheet or set up a new SPE to accept the collateral. Given the demonstrated instability of collateral 
performance, the latter will most likely be uneconomical. On the other hand, unless the sponsor 
can raise funds quickly via capital markets (which is again unlikely to be economical, given 
demonstrated instabilities in collateral performance), accepting new collateral on-balance-sheet 
may result in a substantially increased leverage, leading to reduced regulatory capital ratios and, 
potentially, regulatory insolvency.  
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Our choice of credit card banks as the subject of our study is related to the securitization 
process described above. There are three main reasons for focusing on credit card banks. First, 
credit card securitizations are relatively simple structures, typically consisting of one or two 
tranches of investor securities accompanied by an underlying credit enhancement, i.e., monoline 
insurance coverage, overcollateralization, collateral invested amounts, and/or cash collateral 
accounts. In contrast, for instance, mortgage-backed securities routinely exceed 50 tranches and 
often include complex features like interest- and principal-only strips and more sophisticated 
credit enhancement structures.  
Second, although all securitizations contain early amortization clauses, the difficulty of 
predicting payment rates and chargeoffs in revolving collateral makes those clauses critically 
important in credit card securitizations. Furthermore, the revolving structure also provides a 
convenient avenue for providing recourse by pricing replenishment sales to the SPE below 
market and/or par value.  
Last, general purpose credit card (VISA and MasterCard) sponsors are required by their 
associations to be regulated financial institutions. Furthermore, the largest credit card loan 
sponsors in the US are commercial banks. Commercial banks are required to maintain an 8% 
capital-to-asset ratio or face regulatory action. Accepting new credit card loans on-balance-sheet 
during an early amortization may result in banks’ violating the 8% capital ratio. Hence, with 
revolving collateral (and need for replenishment) and regulatory capital requirements, credit card 
banks have both the ability and the need to avoid early amortization by providing recourse to 
outstanding credit card securitizations. 
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B. Implicit recourse events at credit card banks 
Our data sets combine call report data on banks with Faulkner & Gray data on the quantity 
of managed credit card receivables and securitizations, CRSP stock price data, Compustat 
financial data, Securities Data Corp. data on the structure and frequency of securitizations, and 
Lexis-Nexis news reports of recourse events affecting credit card securitizations. 
Our search of Lexis-Nexis for the period 1987 (the year of the first credit card 
securitization) to 2001 turned up 17 discrete recourse events involving 10 credit card banks. We 
identified recourse events through news filings that reported “ratings affirmations” following a 
period of weak collateral pool performance. The news reports usually give some description of 
the reason for the affirmations. During the period 1987 to 2001, only two credit card 
securitizations entered early amortization without recourse. The associated sponsors, Republic 
Bank (DE) and Southeast Bank, both failed, although the securitizations repaid investors full 
principal in the early amortization process. Table 1 lists our set of recourse events, the bank 
names, the dates, the recourse actions taken, and the specific securities and/or pools involved. 
The set of banks in Table 1 makes up our recourse credit card bank sample. 
The 10 banks identified as providing recourse are invariably large credit card banks. The 
minimum securitization size among these banks in 1996 is that of Tandy National Bank with 
$350 million outstanding, and the maximum is that of Citicorp, with $25.9 billion outstanding. 
The dollar amount of securitizations at recourse credit card banks averages $6.1 billion, with a 
median of $3.5 billion. The average percent of total credit card loans securitized among recourse 
credit card banks was 42%, with a median of 45%. 
Credit card lending and securitization (and hence recourse) are important for the parent 
companies and banks in Table 1. To gauge the importance of credit card lending to the 
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consolidated parent firm, Table 1 shows “managed (both on- and off-balance-sheet) credit card 
loans as a percent of consolidated parent company on-balance-sheet assets.” These percentages 
range from 54% for Sears Roebuck and Company to 5% for First Union, with an average of 25% 
and a median of 8%. Hence, credit cards appear to be an important business line for these parent 
firms and bank holding companies. Surprisingly, measured by managed credit card loans as a 
percent of consolidated parent company on-balance-sheet assets, credit cards appear more 
important for non-bank firms than for the bank holding companies in Table 1. The non-bank 
firms (Sears, Household, AT&T, and Tandy) average managed credit card loans as a percent of 
consolidated parent company on-balance-sheet assets of 43% and a median of 32%, compared 
with an average managed credit card loans as a percent of consolidated parent company on-
balance-sheet assets of 11% and a median of 5% for the bank holding companies (Citibank, 
Mercantile, FCC, Banc One, and First Union).
3 
These credit card operations are usually concentrated in one or two banks in the holding 
company. The column entitled “bank’s credit card loans as percent of consolidated firm (BHC) 
credit card loans” illustrates that concentration. The non-bank firms in Table 1 own individual 
banks that form the basis for their credit card lending. Hence, those banks’ credit card loans as 
percent of consolidated firm (or consolidated bank holding company) credit card loans is 100%. 
Bank holding companies also usually concentrate their credit card operations in one or two bank 
charters that specialize in credit card lending and securitization. Even though First Union’s credit 
cards are 5% of its consolidated assets, they are primarily concentrated (99%) in First Union, 
GA. Similarly, the preponderance of First Chicago’s credit card loans (95%) is held in First 
Chicago, DE. Even Citicorp maintains the majority of its credit card loans (72%) in two charters, 
Citibank, SD, and Citibank, NV. Mercantile holds 51% of its credit card loans in its Hartford, IL, 
                                                 
3 Financial and equity returns are unavailable for Prudential, since it is a non-public firm. 
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charter. Only Banc One distributes its credit cards more widely through its banks, the largest 
individual exposure being 25% in its Dayton, OH, charter.  
In the event of early amortization, the charters described above are those that would be 
affected by the sudden accelerated on-balance-sheet loan growth. That potential growth can be 
gauged by “managed credit card loans as a percent of the credit card bank’s (or banks’) on-
balance-sheet total assets” in Table 1. The largest exposure is at AT&T, with securitizations 
totaling more than 265 times on-balance-sheet bank assets. Tandy comes in second, with 
securitizations totaling 39 times its on-balance-sheet assets. Sears securitizes about 17 times its 
on-balance-sheet assets, Mercantile 3 times, Banc One about 2 times, and Citibank and FCC 
about 1.8 times. Prudential and First Union sell the least, securitizing only about 1 times and 0.5 
times on-balance-sheet assets, respectively.  
The magnitude of securitizations relative to on-balance-sheet assets in Table 1 suggests 
that banks relying on securitization should seek to avoid the possibility of prolonged on-balance-
sheet funding. The firms and bank holding companies in Table 1 provided recourse to existing 
securitizations to avoid that fate.  
Typical actions used to provide recourse in Table 1 are adding new, higher-quality 
accounts to a securitized pool (cherry picking) (Sears 9/11/91, Citicorp 3/15/93, Household 
3/31/93, FCC 7/11/96, AT&T 9/9/96, First Union 6/10/96); selling new receivables to the pool at 
a discount below par (Household 11/13/95, Mercantile 2/12/96, First Union 5/19/97, Prudential 
5/96); increasing the credit enhancement (Sears 5/18/98, Banc One 3/5/97, Prudential 10/21/96, 
Tandy 8/93); getting investors to waive early amortization triggers (Sears 10/14/91, Citicorp 
5/13/91); and getting the servicer (usually the sponsor) to reduce its fees (First Union 2/24/97). 
All violate the true sale provision of GAAP and RAP, yet none of the events resulted in 
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regulatory or accounting restatements that added loans back onto bank balance sheets. The 
recourse events in Table 1 propped up 89 domestic and three foreign securities issues with a 
combined value of about $35.5 billion, comprising almost 7.5% of the $475 billion total public 
credit card asset-backed security domestic issuance reported on the Securities Data Corp. New 
Issues Database through May 2002.  
Table 1 indicates that three recourse events occurred in each of 1991 and 1993. After only 
one event in 1995, six occurred in 1996 and another three in 1997. The last recourse event in our 
sample occurred in 1998. Looking at the distribution of events, it is not surprising that by 1996 
regulators and accountants began to consider more strictly imposing the true sale provisions on 
securitization activity. At that time, the industry – if not regulators themselves – already 
recognized that recourse was a de facto, if not a de jure, violation of the true sale.  
In September 1996 the Comptroller of the Currency issued its first official opinions on the 
treatment of implicit recourse, threatening to bring asset pools benefiting from implicit recourse 
back onto bank balance sheets. A March 31, 1997, article from Asset Sales Report put the issue 
most directly and succinctly. In that article, Lawrence W. Cohn, a senior vice president of equity 
research at PaineWebber, opined:  
We have long been of the opinion that credit card securitizations are financing 
mechanisms rather than bona fide sales of assets... We certainly have no problem with 
banks using the securitization markets as a source of funding. But pretending that the 
assets have really been sold is another matter. Banks want sales treatment because they 
don't have to put up capital against securitized assets, and they don't have to post loss 
reserves either. But clearly the risks of ownership have not passed to buyers of 
securitized paper. In theory, every securitization is supposed to stand on its own. The 
issuer puts up sufficient excess receivables or in some other fashion enhances the pool as 
to garner investor confidence. In fact, if buyers and sellers miscalculate, the seller has 
always made up the difference rather than expose the buyers to risk. Thus, the putative 
seller in fact passes on none of the risks of ownership.  
We don't know how long the fiction of sales treatment will last. … the regulators 
are starting to think about these issues. (“Will Sales Treatment Survive a Recession?”). 
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In late 1996, OCC Bulletin 1996-52: “Securitization-Guidelines for National Banks” 
maintained that “providing post-sale enhancements to prior asset sales constitutes recourse and 
would require full risk-based capital support for the entire pool of assets…” The Comptroller’s 
Handbook in November 1997 reiterated those principles. Nonetheless, regulators seemed 
unwilling or unable to restrict implicit recourse, and the practices continued.  
In 1999, the OCC again reiterated its concern in OCC Bulletin 1999-46: “Interagency 
Guidance on Asset Securitization Activities”: 
Recent examinations have disclosed significant weaknesses in the asset securitization 
practices of some insured depository institutions. These weaknesses raise concerns about 
the general level of understanding and controls among institutions that engage in such 
activities. The most frequently encountered problems stem from: (1) the failure to 
recognize and hold sufficient capital against explicit and implicit recourse obligations 
that frequently accompany securitizations… (p. 1). 
OCC Guidance 2002-20, “Interagency Guidance on Implicit Recourse in Asset Securitizations,” 
described explicit examples of what the agency considers implicit recourse, many of which are 
identical to the events in our sample: 
Banking organizations typically have provided implicit recourse in situations where the 
originating organization perceived that the failure to provide this support, even though 
not contractually required, would damage its future access to the asset-backed securities 
market. An originating banking organization can provide implicit recourse in a variety of 
ways. The ultimate determination as to whether implicit recourse exists depends on the 
facts. However, as discussed in detail later in this document, the following actions point 
to a finding of implicit recourse: 
•  Selling assets to a securitization trust or other special purpose entity (SPE) at a 
discount from the price specified in the securitization documents, which is 
typically par value; 
•  Purchasing assets from a trust or other SPE at an amount greater than fair value; 
•  Exchanging performing assets for nonperforming assets in a trust or other SPE; 
and 
•  Funding credit enhancements beyond contractual requirements. 
By providing implicit recourse, a banking organization signals to the market that the 
risks inherent in the securitized assets are still held by the organization and, in effect, 
have not been transferred … 
Particular attention should be paid to revolving securitizations, such as those used 
for credit card lines … where receivables generated by the lines are sold into the 
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securitization. …Once an early amortization event occurs, the banking organization 
could have difficulties using securitization as a continuing source of funding and, at the 
same time, have to fund the new receivables generated by the lines of credit on its 
balance sheet. Thus, banking organizations have an incentive to avoid early amortization 
by providing implicit support to the securitization. (pp. 3-4). 
Regulatory rulings like these in the period from 1996 to the present prompted significant 
changes in the structure of more recent securitizations and in the type of recourse provided. Most 
recently, regulators have questioned the manner in which NextBank and First Consumers 
National Bank classified fraud losses in order to keep chargeoffs out of securitized pools, a more 
continuous form of implicit recourse. Hence, since 1998 the type of discrete actions of implicit 
recourse that are contained in our sample have not occurred, not because recourse is no longer an 
issue, but because the specific form of recourse we look at is now recognized and prohibited. 
II. Stock Price Effects of Recourse 
In this section we analyze the short- and long-term equity return effects associated with 
recourse on the recourse credit card bank sample (described previously) and a comparative 
benchmark non-recourse credit card bank sample. 
A. Short-term returns for the recourse credit card bank sample 
We analyze equity returns around 14 recourse events involving eight of the sponsors in 
Table 1.
4 We calculate announcement period abnormal returns for firms in the recourse credit 
card bank sample using a standard market model, Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + ei,t , where Ri,t is the return 
on day t for the recourse announcing firm and Rm,t is the equally weighted CRSP index return on 
day t. The announcement day is defined as day 0. The market model parameters, αi and βi, are 
estimated over the 200-day window ending 10 days prior to the announcement (day -210 to day  
                                                 
4 Prudential was not publicly traded at the time of its recourse announcements, and we did not have an exact day for 
the Tandy recourse announcement. Hence, these events are excluded from the analysis. 
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-10). Since our announcements generally come from newswire reports, it is possible that the 
news may have been released after the close of trading on the announcement day. Hence, we 
define the announcement period as the two-day window including the announcement day and the 
day following the announcement (day 0 to day 1). We use the cross-sectional test statistic of 
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) to test the significance of the abnormal returns. This 
statistic controls for event-induced variance increases associated with significant firm events.
5  
Table 2 contains the results of the event study conducted for the recourse credit card bank 
sample. As can be seen in Panel A, the two-day (day 0, 1) abnormal return is positive and 
significant. It appears that the market reaction actually occurs on day 1, which has a positive, 
significant abnormal return of 1.36%. This abnormal return is quite large and indicates that the 
market did not anticipate the recourse announcement.  
Panel B contains the two-day abnormal returns for each of the individual events. Three 
observations about Panel B are important. First, 10 of the 14 events are associated with positive 
abnormal returns, suggesting that there are circumstances under which investors may view 
recourse in a negative light.
6 The substantial variation in the magnitude of both positive and 
negative abnormal returns suggests the results in Panel A are not driven by a few large outliers. 
Second, there is not a discernible time trend to the abnormal returns. The four events associated 
with negative abnormal returns – Citibank 1992, Household Finance November 1995, Mercantile 
                                                 
5 Higgins and Peterson (1998) show that the performance of the cross-sectional t-statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, 
and Poulsen (1991) is superior relative to other test statistics. 
6 We also searched for asset-backed security return behavior around the events indicated. Out of twenty-seven trusts 
(sponsored by six banks) directly affected by recourse in Table 1, we found price data on seven trusts sponsored by 
three banks: First Union MCCT 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B; Prudential Bank & Trust MCCT II 1994-A; and Mercantile 
1995 1A and 1B. First Union and Prudential experienced two recourse events during the period covered by the price 
data, allowing the analysis of twelve event/series pairs. Only two of these event/series pairs, Prudential MCCT II 
1994-A in May 1996 and Mercantile 1995 1B in February 1996, showed changes to returns around the event dates. 
Both experienced increases in price following recourse, as would be expected. However, Prudential 1994 A did not 
show price effects in October 1996, nor did Mercantile 1995 1A in February 1996. Mercantile the sponsor did, 
however, experience negative stock price reactions in February 1996. While further analysis of price series would be 
interesting, data is severely lacking. 
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Bank February 1996, and Sears Roebuck 1998 – do not appear clustered in any one time period, 
nor do abnormal returns appear changed following the OCC’s September 1996 issuance limiting 
the ability of banks to provide support to failing credit-card-backed deals. Third, it appears that 
each recourse announcement conveys new information. In fact, many of the banks that have 
more than one recourse announcement actually have larger abnormal returns associated with 
subsequent announcements than those associated with the first recourse announcement.  
B. Short-term returns for the non-recourse credit card bank sample 
In the presence of asymmetric information, it is not uncommon for shareholders to infer 
information about the value of their company from information that comes from similar 
companies.
7 This is indicative of the transfer of information that exists between firms in similar 
industries. We hypothesize that a similar phenomenon may exist for recourse credit card bank 
sample firms. Specifically, we hypothesize that the announcement of the provision of implicit 
recourse eliminates uncertainty about the industry’s willingness to provide recourse and about 
the value that recourse has for securitizing firms. We therefore analyze whether there exists an 
information transfer between the recourse announcing firm and other firms that are securitizing 
credit card debt.  
To test this hypothesis, we calculate abnormal returns associated with recourse 
announcements for a non-recourse credit card bank sample (other securitizing banks that did 
not provide recourse). For each year represented in the recourse sample, we identify all 
securitizing credit card sponsors listed in Faulkner & Gray’s Card Industry Directory that did not 
provide recourse at any time during the sample period. In the event that some of these banks did 
not report securitizations to Faulkner & Gray, their issuance was confirmed using Lexis-Nexis 
                                                 
7 For example, Szewczyk (1992) finds that the announcement of a seasoned equity offering by one company in an 
industry will create a negative price response for all companies in the industry. 
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and the Securities Data Corp. New Issues Database and (far less detailed) call report data where 
available. Members of the non-recourse credit card bank sample for each year are identified 
Table 3.
 8 
To calculate abnormal returns for the non-recourse credit card bank sample, we use the 
portfolio approach suggested by Szewczyk (1992). For each recourse announcement, we create 
an equally weighted portfolio of returns for all firms in the non-recourse credit card bank sample 
over the period from -210 days prior to the announcement to 10 days after the announcement. 
Using the portfolio returns, market model parameters (described above) are estimated over the 
period from -210 days to -10 days. Again, we define the announcement period as days 0 and 1 
and use the cross-sectional t-statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) to test for 
significance. Although we do not have returns data on Prudential (a non-public company) itself, 
we have an exact announcement date for one of the Prudential recourse announcements. 
Including that event in the analysis raises the number of events analyzed to 15. 
Table 4 contains the results of the non-recourse credit card bank sample event study. Panel 
A contains average abnormal returns across all events. Significant positive abnormal returns for 
the non-recourse banks are found around the recourse announcement (days 0 and 1). The two-
day announcement period abnormal return is 0.66% and is significant at the 1% level. Such a 
large abnormal return for the industry is rather surprising, suggesting that the market places a 
great deal of importance on the recourse announcements of other banks. 
Panel B contains the results for the specific events investigated in the sample. Similar to 
the results found for the recourse sample, it is clear that the results are not driven by outliers. Ten 
                                                 
8 The dollar amount of securitizations outstanding at the 92 banks ranges from more than $27 billion for MBNA, 
representing 80% of MBNA’s total (both on- and off-balance-sheet) credit card loans, to just under $39 million at 
American General Financial Corp., representing about 7% of American General’s credit card loans. Average dollar 
amount of securitizations outstanding in the 92 banks is about $4 billion, and median volume is about $987 million. 
The average percent of total credit card loans securitized among these 92 banks is 53% and the median is 47%. 
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of the 15 events are associated with positive abnormal returns for the non-recourse banks. Only 
one of the events that generated large negative abnormal returns for the recourse sample 
(Household, 1995) is associated with negative abnormal returns for non-recourse banks. 
However, the magnitude of this and the other negative reactions among non-recourse credit card 
banks is small, averaging -0.28%, compared with the positive reactions, which average 1.13%. 
We observe that abnormal returns for the non-recourse credit card bank sample do not seem to be 
driven by outliers and do not illustrate a discernible time trend. Again, abnormal returns 
accompanying recourse remain positive after the 1996 OCC announcement of increased 
regulatory stringency. Thus, we conclude that recourse announcements convey significant 
positive information valuable to all credit card securitizing banks. 
III. Long-Run Stock Price and Operating Performance Effects of Recourse 
Section II suggests that the announcement of recourse by credit card banks has a substantial 
impact on both recourse credit card banks and non-recourse credit card banks. It is possible, 
however, that the market does not fully anticipate or properly value the information contained in 
important event announcements. In such cases, the effects associated with the announcement 
would be mitigated over time. Thus, the events may also have an impact on the long-run stock 
price and operating performance of the announcing firms.
9 We are interested in determining if 
such post-announcement effects exist for our recourse credit card bank sample firms.  
We are also interested in determining why some banks provide recourse and others do not. 
An obvious reason for providing recourse is simple necessity. It may be that the banks in our 
sample are simply performing very poorly relative to other banks and must provide recourse as a 
                                                 
9 For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) find firms that announcing seasoned equity offerings experience stock 
price declines, relative to a matching sample of similar firms, for several years after the announcement and 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) find that the operating performance of firms announcing a seasoned equity offering also 
declines, relative to a matching sample, post-announcement.  
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means to keep their issues afloat. Thus, in this section we examine long-run pre- and post-
announcement stock price and operating performance of recourse credit card bank sample firms. 
A. Matching samples for long-term comparisons 
We use matching samples to determine if long-run performance among the recourse credit 
card bank sample firms is substantially different from that of other firms. Similar to other 
studies, our study creates matching samples by identifying matching firms comparable to each 
announcing firm. We identify matching firms using two methodologies. First, we match recourse 
credit card bank sample firms with others using a procedure similar to that of Loughran and 
Ritter (1997). According to this procedure, each firm in the recourse credit card bank sample is 
paired with another firm listed on the Compustat database based on SIC code, asset size, and 
book-to-market equity ratio.
10 Potential matching firms have the same four-digit SIC code as the 
announcing firm and have an asset size between 25 percent and 200 percent of the announcing 
firm at the time of the recourse announcement. From these potential firms, we choose as 
matching firms those that have the closest book-to-market equity ratio to each recourse credit 
card bank sample firm. We call the resulting sample the size and book-to-market equity matched 
sample (SBEM sample).  
The second matching sample is constructed by pairing each firm in the recourse credit card 
bank sample with its closest counterpart in the non-recourse credit card bank sample (described 
in section II.B) on the basis of outstanding securitization volume and portfolio size at the time of 
the recourse announcement. We call this the credit card issue size matched sample (CCISM 
sample).  
                                                 
10 Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest including the book-to-market equity ratio as a matching variable. 
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One problem that we encounter in examining long-run operating performance is the 
presence of multiple events occurring within a short period of time. Following the methodology 
of Loughran and Ritter (1997), we exclude subsequent recourse announcements occurring during 
the two years following a recourse announcement in the sample.
11 Thus, the sample used for the 
examination of long-run performance contains 10 recourse-announcing firm observations. Table 
5 lists the recourse credit card bank sample firms and the selected matching companies based on 
the two selection criteria.  
B. Long-term returns for the recourse credit card bank sample 
To examine the long-run stock price performance of recourse announcing banks, we 
compute buy and hold returns for one year before the recourse announcement and for two years 
after the recourse announcement. We calculate abnormal long-run returns for the recourse 
announcing firms using both the SBEM sample and CCISM sample as benchmark portfolios. 
The significance of the abnormal returns is tested using a nonparametric sign test. 
Table 6 contains the results of the long-run median stock price performance tests 
(Appendix A contains individual firm results). Panel A shows the median buy and hold returns 
for the recourse credit card bank sample firms, the SBEM sample firms, and the CCISM sample 
firms. Panel B compares recourse credit card bank sample firms to the SBEM sample firms and 
the CCISM sample firms. One year prior to the announcement, returns for recourse credit card 
bank sample firms are significantly lower than those for CCISM sample firms. Two years post-
announcement, returns for recourse credit card bank sample firms are significantly higher than 
those for SBEM sample firms. Thus, it appears that the recourse credit card bank sample firms 
are under-performing matching firms prior to the recourse announcement, perhaps leading to the 
                                                 
11 Given data limitations due to mergers, we examine only stock price and operating performance in the two years 
after a recourse announcement; thus, we screen only for events occurring within two years. 
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recourse announcement. After the recourse announcement, performance improves, suggesting 
that the provision of recourse does not result in a long-term cost to the recourse credit card bank 
sample firms in terms of stock price performance. 
C. Long-run operating performance 
In measuring long-run operating performance we examine five operating performance 
ratios: EBITDA to assets, profit margin, return on assets, EBITDA to sales,
12 and return on 
equity. All operating performance data come from the Compustat database. We define year 0 as 
the fiscal year in which the recourse announcement occurs, and we examine operating 
performance over a two-year window before and after the recourse announcement (fiscal years –
2 through +2). To determine if significant differences are present in the operating performance 
recourse credit card bank sample firms and the matching firms, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 
used.
13 Additionally, we examine the change from fiscal year –2 to +1 and from +1 to +2 for the 
differences between the recourse credit card bank sample firm and matching firm ratios. Again, 
we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to determine if there are significant differences between 
recourse credit card bank sample firm ratios and the matching firm ratios. 
Median operating performance results appear in Table 7 (Appendix B contains individual 
firm results). Panels A, B, and C contain summary median operating performance measures for 
the recourse credit card bank sample firms, the SBEM sample firms, and the CCISM sample 
firms. In general, it again appears that the operating performance of the recourse credit card bank 
sample firms deteriorates prior to the support announcement and improves after the support 
announcement.  
                                                 
12 Sales is Compustat item 12, Sales-Net, the same item number used by Loughran and Ritter (1997). For banks, this 
item includes total current operating revenue and net pretax profit or loss on securities sold or redeemed. 
13 The method used to determine differences in operating performance follows that of Loughran and Ritter (1997). 
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Those differences are confirmed statistically in Panels D, E, F, and G. Panel D examines 
annual differences in operating performance between recourse credit card bank sample firms and 
the SBEM matching firms and Panel E contains annual differences in operating performance 
between recourse credit card bank sample firms and the CCISM matching firms. In general, the 
annual differences between the recourse credit card bank sample firms and the matching firms 
are not statistically significant at conventional levels. When comparing recourse credit card bank 
sample firms to the SBEM sample the only statistically significant difference in operating 
performance occurs in the year following the announcement, where EBITDA to assets for 
recourse credit card bank sample firms are significantly lower than the SBEM firms. There are a 
few more statistically significant differences between recourse credit card bank sample firms and 
the CCISM sample. Profit margins for recourse announcing firms are substantially lower than the 
CCISM firms in the year of and the year after the recourse announcement. EBITDA to assets, 
however, is shown to be larger for recourse credit card bank sample firms two years after the 
recourse announcement. Thus, again, there appears to be some slight underperformance around 
the announcement and some indication of improvement after the announcement.  
Examining performance changes over periods longer than one year yields more statistically 
significant differences. Panels F and G contain the median change from fiscal year -2 to +1 and 
from +1 to +2 in the ratios of recourse credit card bank sample firm performance measures 
relative to the SBEM and CCISM matched samples, respectively. Comparison of operating 
performance of recourse credit card bank sample firms to the SBEM firms shows that 
announcing firms have a statistically significant increase in operating performance after the 
recourse announcement, whether measured by EBITDA/assets, profit margin, return on assets, 
EBITDA/sales, or return on equity. Comparison of recourse credit card bank sample firms 
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relative to the CCISM matched sample shows that the profit margin and EBITDA/sales for 
recourse credit card bank sample firms decreased by statistically significant amounts over the 
years prior to the announcement. Furthermore, EBITDA/assets, profit margin, return on assets, 
and return on equity for the recourse credit card bank sample firms increased by statistically 
significant amounts, relative to the CCISM sample, in the years following the announcement. 
These results are again similar to those found for long-run stock returns. Performance of the 
recourse credit card bank sample firms was poor prior to the announcement but improved post-
announcement. 
IV. Default Probability and Recourse 
Results for long-term equity returns and operating performance bring up the possibility 
that weak companies are the ones that provide recourse. If recourse credit card banks are weak 
enough, support may place the deposit insurance safety net at risk. We examine how weak our 
recourse credit card bank sample firms are by including well-known default prediction variables 
in a probit model of support to analyze their effect. The model is estimated on a data set 
constructed by combining the recourse credit card and non-recourse credit card bank samples. 
Finding that variables associated with default are similarly associated with support would 
suggest that ABS support is provided by firms at risk of default and/or insolvency. 
We obtain our default prediction variables from the seven-variable ZETA™ model of 
Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977). Their well-known model accords well with basic 
finance theory, which suggests that the probability of insolvency should be an increasing 
function of asset risk and leverage. Additionally, asset liquidity (relative to liabilities) may also 
be a factor influencing the risk of failure. If the same relationships predict support, we surmise 
that support is provided by weak banks (those closer to default). 
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The Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) variables are return on assets; the 
variability of return on assets; the debt service ratio; accumulated profits; liquidity; the market to 
book ratio of capital; and size of the firm. We obtain data to compute the variables for our 
matched credit card bank sample from bank call reports, bank holding company Y-9 reports, and 
CRSP. Banks that provide recourse are coded as 1, and banks that do not provide recourse are 
coded as 0.   
Results of our Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) variant appear in Table 8. 
Although Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) associate lower return on assets, liquidity, 
capital, and size and higher standard deviations of return on assets and debt service ratios with 
default, we find the coefficients on return on assets, liquidity, capital, standard deviation of 
return on assets, and debt service ratios opposite those results (though the coefficients for capital 
and the debt service ratio are statistically insignificant). Only cumulative profitability and size 
obtain signs that suggest recourse may be associated with default, though only the coefficient on 
size is statically significant. This size coefficient may not be surprising, since we are using the 
union of the recourse and non-recourse credit card bank samples, and the firms providing 
recourse are typically not industry leaders. Hence, we find that firms providing recourse have 
higher return on assets, greater liquidity, less variability in return on assets, and are of smaller 
size than non-recourse credit card banks. On the basis of these results, it appears that providing 
recourse is not associated with the probability of default or insolvency in a manner that may 
place the safety net at risk. Rather, the strategy is used by firms that have liquidity sufficient to 
provide recourse and recover thereafter.  
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IV. Subsequent Loan Sale Terms and Conditions  
Recourse is an indication that some aspect of the securitization was unanticipated, whether 
that be lower than expected credit quality, legal terms regarding the mechanics of disbursements, 
or regulatory action. Hence, while the bank or parent firm may not have suffered, subsequent 
deals may be structured in ways that help ensure investors avoid the default and reinvestment 
risks that accompany early amortization. Thus, we examine dimensions of pool size, support, and 
coupons for both A and B tranches, the underlying (tertiary) credit support, the average issue 
frequency prior to support, and the time between issues before and after the support event for our 
recourse credit card bank sample. For comparison we examine the same dimensions for the 
CCISM sample firms. This will allow us to determine if any observed changes in the recourse 
sample are firm specific or are associated with overall changes in the credit card securitization 
market. 
A. Changes in securitization terms for recourse credit card bank sample firms 
Table 9 lists attributes for recourse credit card bank sample deals brought to market before 
and after 10 of the support events listed in Table 1. The events relating to Mercantile, Prudential, 
and Tandy did not have any other comparison issues either before or after the recourse event. 
First Union’s only issues were its 1996-1 and 1996-2, both of which required recourse. We 
hypothesize that, following recourse, ABS investors might expect increased enhancement for the 
pool to receive a desired rating, an increased coupon to compensate for higher unexpected risk, 
or higher levels of tertiary (C-class) credit enhancement for the entire deal.  
Few of the comparisons in Table 9 illustrate evidence consistent with this hypothesis. A-
class and B-class enhancement rise in only one of the deal comparisons – that associated with the 
Sears Roebuck May 18, 1998, support event. In this case, the A-class enhancement level rose 
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from 11.5% before support to over 15% after, and the B-class support rose from 7% to 9%. 
Following the Household International November 13, 1995, support event the amount of 
enhancement rose, but the sponsor switched to a different type of enhancement, from a 12% 
collateral invested amount (CIA) to a 15.61% overcollateralization (OC). The other events 
exhibit the same or sometimes decreased support levels after the event.  
Coupons are also typically the same or lower after the support event. The only increase 
evident in Table 9 is that for B-class coupons before and after the AT&T Corp September 9, 
1996, event. 
All in all, it appears that few recourse events are associated with pool enhancement, 
tertiary enhancement, or coupon changes that could be associated with investor concern.  
Market access, however, may pose an additional means by which investors react. The last 
two columns in Table 9 compare the average time between issues prior to recourse and the time 
between the before and after issues around the support event for our group of sponsors. 
Excepting the Sears Roebuck September 11, 1991, support event, which was followed closely by 
another support event for that sponsor, the time lapse between issues around the support event 
average over four times the interval between issues prior to the event. In two cases, Sears 
Roebuck May 18, 1998, and AT&T Corp. September 9, 1996, sponsors took deals to market the 
day after support. In both cases, however, these sponsors waited a substantial period – 411 days 
for Sears (308% of the average issuance interval) and 317 days for AT&T (310% of the average 
issuance interval) – before taking their next deals to market. Hence, although it appears sponsors 
eventually return to the market at terms similar to those prior to support, they often do not do so 
on the same schedule as prior to providing support.  
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B. Changes in securitization terms for CCISM sample firms 
Table 10 illustrates loan sale terms for 13 credit card issue size matching (CCISM) sample 
firms around each recourse credit card sample firm’s related recourse announcement. Again, 
there is scant evidence of change in A- or B-tranche composition or pricing changes associated 
with recourse events.  
Furthermore, average issuance intervals around recourse, on average, increase only about 
2.3 times over the pre-recourse interval for the CCISM firms in Table 10 compared with over 
four times the pre-recourse interval for recourse credit card bank sample firms in Table 9. A lot 
of this increase is driven by one outlier, Chase, around Citigroup’s March 1993 recourse 
announcement. In that case, Chase’s issue interval increases over 10 times its pre-recourse 
interval. Excluding that outlier from the sample reduces the average increase for CCISM sample 
firms to 1.46 times the pre-recourse interval. Hence, the time between issuance does not seem to 
increase around recourse events for CCISM sample firms as much as for recourse credit card 
bank sample firms. Thus, the increased time to issuance observed for the recourse bank sample 
does not appear to be associated with a marketwide effect, and it appears that, as with the 
commercial paper market, the penalty for recourse is market access.  
V. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper began by observing that securitization is believed to pose risks to sponsors of 
the underlying collateral. These risks are believed to be especially acute with revolving 
collateral, like credit card loans, because of the propensity for recourse provided by the sponsor. 
The paper documents 17 discrete recourse events that occurred during the 1990s and examines 
the effects of recourse to the sponsor by examining short- and long-term stock returns, long-term 
operating performance, default probabilities, and follow-on terms of securitization.  
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The paper demonstrates that sponsor stock prices, on average, increase in both the short- 
and long-run following recourse. Long-run median operating performance also improves ex post. 
However, ex ante, the firms providing recourse are weaker than matched samples of their 
counterparts. Nonetheless, the firms providing recourse are not so weak as to suggest they face 
an imminent threat of default or insolvency, such that recourse could represent a significant 
threat to the bank safety net.  
Despite improvements in stock returns and operating performance for the sponsor 
following recourse, it appears sponsors will face a penalty for unexpected performance shortfalls 
in their securitizations. Although terms of the securitizations (coupons, composition, credit 
enhancements) for the most part remain consistent when firms return to market after recourse, 
the paper documents that firms providing recourse may face long delays before returning to 
market. Hence, much like with commercial paper, although there appears to be little time series 
variation in the contractual terms of securitizations, firms face market exclusion if they 
demonstrate an inability to sell sound investment-grade paper. 
The results outlined above should not be construed as favoring recourse. While positive 
results following recourse suggest that sponsors act rationally, recourse still violates FASB 140 
and regulatory restrictions governing the true sale of assets. Furthermore, recourse represents an 
implicit contractual provision that is not disclosed to the sponsor’s investors. However, the 
results presented in this paper suggest that recourse can be valuable and can benefit the sponsor 
and that there may be a gray area between treating assets as “sold” and taking them off balance 
sheets and treating them as “retained” and keeping them on. Clarifying this distinction and 
measuring, analyzing, and parameterizing that gray area are therefore important topics for future 
research.  
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Company    Managed Credit




Sheet Total Assets 
  Bank’s On-
balance Sheet 
Credit Card Loans 
as Percent of 
Consolidated Firm 
(BHC) On-balance 
Sheet Credit Card 
Loans 
Managed Credit 
Card Loans as 





Trusts Supported  Support Provided 
Sears Roebuck and Company  54%  100%  1,682%  9/11/91  Sears Credit Account Trust 1990-C  Added higher quality accounts 
Sears Roebuck and Company  54%  100%  1,682%  10/14/91  Sears Credit Account Trust 1990–A,D,E and 
1989-C,E 
Removed early amortization trigger 
Sears Roebuck and Company  54%  100%  1,682%  5/18/98  Sears Credit Account Master Trust II  Increased credit enhancement –  
Ratings affirmation followed 
Citibank 17%  72%    184% 
(NV, SD) 
5/13/91  Standard Credit Card Trust 1989-2,3,4,5 and 
1990-1 
Lowered base rate by 2.3% 
Citibank 17%  72%    184% 
(NV, SD) 
3/15/93  National Credit Card Trust 1989-2,4,5 
Standard Credit Card Trust 1990-1,3,4 
European Credit Card Trust 1989-1,2 and 1990-1 
Added new accounts – 
Ratings affirmation followed 
Household Finance  61%  100%  186%  3/31/93  Household Credit Trust 1991-2  Added new accounts –  
Ratings affirmation followed 
Household Finance  61%  100%  186%  11/13/95  Household Private Label Master Credit Card 
Trust II  
Added new accounts, increased 
discount on receivables – 
Ratings affirmation followed 
Mercantile Bank  7%  51% 
(Hartford, IL) 
309%  2/12/96  Mercantile Credit Card Master Trust 1995-1  Added discounted receivables –  
Ratings affirmation followed 
FCC National Bank  17%  95%  
(DE) 
188%  7/11/96  First Chicago Master Trust II  Added new accounts – 
Ratings affirmation followed 
AT&T    24%  100%  26,531% 9/9/96  AT&T Universal Card Master Trust  Added new accounts 
Banc One Corporation  10%  25% 
(Dayton, OH) 
205%  3/5/97  Banc One Master Credit Card Trust  Increased credit enhancement – 
Ratings affirmation followed 
First Union   5%  99% (GA)  52%  6/10/96  First Union Master Credit Card Trust  Removed lower quality accounts 
First Union  5%  99% (GA)  52%  2/24/97  First Union Master Credit Card Trust 1996-1  Waived servicing fee 
First Union  5%  99% (GA)  52%  5/19/97  First Union Master Credit Card Trust 1996-1,2  Added discounted receivables 
Prudential Bank and Trust  NA
a  100%  101%  10/21/96  PB&T Master Credit Card Trust II 1994-A  Increased credit enhancement – 
Ratings affirmation followed 
Prudential Bank and Trust  NA
a  100%  101%  5/96  PB&T Master Credit Card Trust II 1994-A  Added discounted receivables 
Tandy Corporation  32%  100%  3,919%  8/93  Tandy Master Trust Series A  Increased credit enhancement 
a Prudential Bank and Trust is owned by a non-public insurance company. 
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Table 2 
Abnormal Stock Returns for Credit Card Banks Announcing Recourse 
 
 
The following table contains abnormal stock returns for credit card banks that announce the provision of recourse to 
an outstanding credit card securitization for the 10 days prior to and the 10 days following the recourse 
announcement date. We examine a two-day announcement widow, the announcement day (Day 0) and the following 
day (Day 1), to determine the market’s reaction to the announcement. The significance of the abnormal returns is 
tested using the cross-sectional test statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991). The sample size is 14. 
Panel A contains average abnormal returns across all events. Panel B contains the two-day announcement window 
return and the standardized abnormal return for the individual events. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level, ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, and *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level 
 
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns  
 
Days  Average abnormal return  Standard deviation of 
abnormal returns 
Cross-sectional t-statistic 
-10  0.0008 0.0110 0.1812 
-9 -0.0055**  0.0115  -2.2634 
-8  -0.0079 0.0216 -1.3130 
-7  0.0003 0.0105 0.3164 
-6  -0.0018 0.0171 -0.4189 
-5 0.0057*  0.0112  1.9777 
-4  0.0051 0.0227 0.8204 
-3  0.0008 0.0163 0.1233 
-2  0.0029 0.0127 0.8358 
-1  -0.0004 0.0173 -0.4732 
0  -0.0037 0.0103 -1.4719 
1 0.0136***  0.0126  3.8380 
2  0.0027 0.0210 0.0391 
3  0.0000 0.0116 0.0276 
4 -0.0066***  0.0106  -2.6182 
5  0.0049 0.0132 1.2834 
6  -0.0036 0.0114 -1.1707 
7 0.0008  0.0145  -0.1222 
8 0.0062*  0.0116  1.9437 
9  0.0028 0.0167 0.3241 
10  0.0067 0.0155 1.7185 
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Table 2…Continued 
Abnormal Stock Returns for Credit Card Banks Announcing Recourse  
 
 
Panel B: Two-Day Announcement Window Abnormal Returns for All Events 
 




Citibank 5/13/91  -0.0047  -0.1182 
Sears Roebuck and Co.  9/11/91  0.0055  0.2322 
Sears Roebuck and Co.  10/14/91  0.0292  1.2677 
Citibank 3/15/93  0.0333  1.3199 
Household Finance  3/31/93  0.0026  0.1102 
Household Finance  11/13/95  -0.0123  -0.5120 
Mercantile Bank  2/12/96  -0.0126  -0.9251 
First Union  6/10/96  0.0030  0.1587 
FCC National Bank  7/11/96  0.0234  1.0278 
AT&T 9/9/96  0.0221  0.8687 
First Union  2/24/97  0.0079  0.4059 
Banc One Corp.  3/5/97  0.0313  1.4116 
First Union  5/19/97  0.0191  1.1048 
Sears Roebuck and Co.  5/18/98  -0.0081  -0.2574 
 Mean  0.0010  0.4353 
 Median  0.0067  0.3190 
 Standard  Deviation  0.0163  0.7429 
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Table 3 
Non-Recourse Credit Card Bank Sample Composition 
 
 
Name 1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998
A d v a n t a  N B ,  U S A XXXXX
American Express Centurion Bank X X X
American General Financial Center X X X
Bank of America, NA X X X X
Bank of New York, DE X X X X
C a p i t a l  O n e  B a n k XXXX
Carolina First Bank X X X X
Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA X X X X X X
Chemical Bank X X
First Commerce Bancshares X X
F i r s t  U S A  B a n k XXXX
Firstar X
Fleet National Bank X
M B N A  A m e r i c a ,  N A XXXXXX
Mellon Bank Corp. X X X X
N a t i o n a l  C i t y  B a n k XXXXXX
N a t i o n s B a n k ,  N A XXXXXX
Norwest Bank IA, NA X X X
P e o p l e s  B a n k XXXXX
Providian National Bank X X X
Signet Bank X X X X X
Valley National Bank X
Wachovia Bank, NA X X X
Wells Fargo Bank X X
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Table 4 
Abnormal Stock Returns for Non-Recourse Providing Credit Card ABS Sponsors 
Associated with an Announcement of Recourse 
 
 
The following table contains abnormal stock returns for all non-recourse providing banks issuing credit card backed 
debt for the 10 days prior to and the 10 days following the announcement of the provision of recourse for a credit 
card securitization. Also, the cumulative abnormal return over the announcement day (Day 0) and the following day 
(Day 1) is included. Abnormal returns are calculated for the portfolio of all firms identified as credit card backed 
debt sponsors at the time of a support announcement. The significance of the abnormal returns is tested using the 
cross-sectional test statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991). Panel A contains average abnormal returns 
across the whole sample. Panel B contains two-day abnormal returns and standardized abnormal returns for the 
individual events. The sample size is 15. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level, ** indicates significance at the 
0.05 level, and *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level 
 
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns 
 
Days  Average abnormal return  Standard deviation of 
abnormal returns 
Cross-sectional t-statistic 
-10  0.0013 0.0078 0.6964 
-9  -0.0019 0.0083 -0.9733 
-8  -0.0037 0.0115 -1.3194 
-7  -0.0035 0.0068 -1.6652 
-6  0.0006 0.0093 0.6366 
-5  -0.0006 0.0079 -0.7110 
-4  0.0017 0.0087 0.4823 
-3  0.0002 0.0060 0.2001 
-2  0.0023 0.0096 0.8755 
-1  0.0007 0.0059 0.4672 
0 0.0039**  0.0078  2.0404 
1 0.0027**  0.0058  2.1622 
2  -0.0010 0.0106 -0.1048 
3  0.0013 0.0080 0.6650 
4  -0.0027 0.0068 -1.4459 
5 0.0001  0.0074  -0.0633 
6  0.0006 0.0104 0.0245 
7  0.0018 0.0098 0.8302 
8  0.0027 0.0070 1.3787 
9  -0.0009 0.0087 -0.4194 
10  0.0023 0.0075 1.1954 
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Table 4…Continued 
Abnormal Stock Returns for Non-Recourse Providing Credit Card ABS Sponsors 
Associated with an Announcement of Recourse 
 
 
Panel B: Two-Day Announcement Window Abnormal Returns for Non-Recourse Providing Credit Card Banks  
 
Announcing Firm  Announcement Date  Two-Day (Days 0,1) 
Abnormal Return for 
Non-Recourse Providing 
Credit Card Banks 
Standardized Two-Day 
Abnormal Return for 
Non-Recourse Providing 
Credit Card Banks 
Citibank 5/13/91  0.0027  0.1027 
Sears Roebuck and Co.  9/11/91  -0.0063  -0.2845 
Sears Roebuck and Co.  10/14/91  0.0266  1.4457 
Citibank 3/15/93  -0.0005  -0.0388 
Household Finance  3/31/93  -0.0041  -0.3218 
Household Finance  11/13/95  -0.0026  -0.2668 
Mercantile Bank  2/12/96  0.0063  0.6010 
First Union  6/10/96  -0.0004  -0.0346 
FCC National Bank  7/11/96  0.0199  1.8446 
AT&T 9/9/96  0.0152  1.4498 
Prudential Bank and Trust  10/21/96  0.0015  0.1386 
First Union  2/24/97  0.0101  0.9410 
Banc One Corp.  3/5/97  0.0114  1.0596 
First Union  5/19/97  0.0109  0.8630 
Sears Roebuck and Co.  5/18/98  0.0087  0.6577 
 Mean  0.0066  0.5438 
 Median  0.0063  0.6010 
 Standard  Deviation  0.0093  0.7068 
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Table 5 
Matched Sample Composition 
 
 
Recourse Provider Event Date




Credit Card Bank 
Issue Size Matched 
Sample 
(CCISM Sample)
Citigroup 5/13/1991 Bank of America Chase
Sears 9/11/1991 Wal Mart Bank of New York
Household Int'l 3/31/1993 Beneficial Advanta
Tandy 8/1/1993 Circuit City Charming Shoppes
Mercantile 2/12/1996 Compass National City Corp
First Union 6/10/1996 KeyCorp Peoples Bank
First Chicago 7/11/1996 BankBoston Chase
AT&T 9/9/1996 Verizon Capital One
Bank One 3/5/1997 FleetBoston Bank of America





  33 
Table 6 
Holding Period Returns for Recourse Announcing and Matching Firms 
 
 
The following table contains holding period returns for recourse announcing firms and for two different matching 
samples. Returns are calculated for one-year pre-announcement, one-year post-announcement, and two-year post 
announcement holding periods. Panel A contains median long-run returns for the recourse firms, and for firms in the 
two matching samples. Panel B contains the median difference in returns for recourse announcing firms relative to a 
sample of firms matched on size and book-to-market equity. The matching procedure used is similar to that of 
Loughran and Ritter (1997). Panel C contains the median difference in returns for recourse announcing firms 
relative to a sample of firms matched on the amount of outstanding credit-card backed issuances at the time of the 
support announcement. Sign tests are conducted to determine if significant differences in the returns of the 
announcing and matching firms exists. * indicates a significant difference at the 10% level, ** indicates a significant 
difference at the 5% level, and *** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level for the sign test 
 
Panel A: Median holding period returns for recourse announcing firms, size and book-to-market equity matched 
firms, and credit card issue size matched firms 
 
 Holding  Period 






Recourse announcing firms 
 
0.2088 0.2918 0.9001 
     
Size and book-to-market equity 
matched firms (SBEM Sample) 
0.3667 0.3298 0.4065 
     
Credit card issue size matched firms 
(CCISM Sample) 




Panel B: Median difference in holding period returns for announcing firms and matched firms 
 
 Holding  Period 






Announcing Returns Minus SBEM 
Matching Firm Returns  -0.1314  0.0112  0.1659* 
     
Announcing Returns Minus CCISM 
Matching Firm Returns  -0.0931*  -0.2266  0.0026 
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Table 7 
Median Operating Performance Measures for Recourse Announcing Firms and 
Differences in Medians between Announcing and Matching Firms 
 
 
Panels A, B, and C contain median operating performance measures for recourse announcing firms, size and book-
to-market equity matched firms, and issue size matched firms. Panel D contains the difference in median operating 
performance between announcing firms and a size and book-to-market equity matched sample of firms. The 
matching procedure is similar to that used by Loughran and Ritter (1997). Panel E contains the difference in median 
operating performance between the announcing firms and a matched sample of firms chosen based on the amount of 
credit-card backed securities outstanding in the year of the support announcement. Panels F and G contain the 
change from fiscal year –2 to +1 and from +1 to +2 in the announcing firm ratios relative to the size and book-to-
market equity matched firms and the issue size matched firms, respectively. Z-statistics are calculated using the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to determine the equality of the distributions between the announcing firms and the 
matching firms. * indicates a significant difference at the 10% level, ** indicates a significant difference at the 5% 
level, and *** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level. There are 10 announcing firm observations available 
in years –2 through +1 and 9 available in year +2. 
 














-2 0.0456  0.0524  0.0136  0.2612  0.1558 
-1 0.0395  0.0422  0.0101  0.2340  0.1341 
0 0.0424  0.0829  0.0116  0.2745  0.1356 
1 0.0351  0.0853  0.0120  0.2589  0.1599 
2 0.0398  0.0881  0.0155  0.2809  0.1757 
 














-2 0.0660  0.0798  0.0110  0.3144  0.1587 
-1 0.0597  0.0959  0.0129  0.2878  0.1707 
0 0.0582  0.0989  0.0147  0.3166  0.1637 
1 0.0572  0.0904  0.0137  0.3283  0.1766 
2 0.0733  0.0939  0.0124  0.3324  0.1549 
 














-2 0.0321  0.1136  0.0121  0.2860  0.1670 
-1 0.0329  0.1210  0.0128  0.2978  0.1667 
0 0.0324  0.1228  0.0131  0.3163  0.1554 
1 0.0338  0.1126  0.0130  0.3279  0.1691 
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Table 7…continued 
Median Operating Performance Measures for Recourse Announcing Firms and 
Differences in Medians between Announcing and Matching Firms 
 
 
Panel D: Differences between recourse credit card bank sample firms and size and book-to-market equity | 














-2 -0.0004  0.0012  0.0001  0.0075  -0.0095 
-1 -0.0027  0.0022  -0.0018  0.0091  -0.0148 
0 -0.0008  -0.0155  -0.0024  -0.0022  -0.0269 
1 -0.0028*  -0.0054  -0.0022  -0.0184  -0.0215 
2 0.0010  0.0107  0.0001  0.0057  0.0231 
 
Panel E: Differences between recourse credit card bank sample firms and credit card issue size  














-2  0.0205* 0.0082  0.0022 0.0413 -0.0043 
-1 0.0073  -0.0117  0.0006  0.0049  -0.0282 
0 0.0112  -0.0369**  -0.0012  -0.0112  -0.0329 
1 0.0065  -0.0268**  -0.0013  -0.0219  -0.0202 
2 0.0159**  -0.0159  0.0025  -0.0101  0.0340 
 
Panel F: Median change in the ratios of recourse credit card bank sample firms performance measures relative to the 
size and book-to-market equity matched (SBEM) sample 
 









-2 to +1  0.0002  -0.0326  -0.0039  -0.0254  -0.0324 
+1 to +2  0.0093***  0.0212**  0.0061***  0.0255**  0.0312*** 
  
 
Panel G: Median change in the ratios of recourse credit card bank sample firms performance measures relative to the 
credit card issue size matched (CCISM) sample 
 









-2 to +1  -0.0081  -0.0398**  -0.0044  -0.04625*  0.0054 




a Sales is Compustat item 12, Sales-Net, the same item number as used by Loughran and Ritter (1997). For banks, 
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Table 8 
Estimation of the Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) Model for Recourse Providing 
and Non-Recourse Providing Credit Card Backed Security Sponsors 
 
 
The following table contains estimates of the 7-variable ZETA™ model of Altman, Haldeman, 
and Narayanan (1977). The Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) variables are: return on 
assets; the variability of return on assets; the debt service ratio; accumulated profits; liquidity; the 
market to book ratio of capital; and size of the firm. We include the variables in a probit model 
of support to analyze their effect on the decision to provide recourse. Recourse providing banks 
are coded as 1 and non-recourse providing banks are coded as zero. Parameter estimates, chi-
square statistics, and p-values associated with the chi-square statistics are reported. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Variable  Parameter Estimate     Chi-Square  P-Value 
Intercept 13.1251    2.3956  0.1217 
ROA 346.0000  **  4.3617  0.0368 
SIGMAROA -921.0000  ***  10.3285  0.0013 
DEBTSERV -0.2253    0.0229  0.8797 
CUMUPROF -24.9929    0.8994  0.3429 
LIQUID 8.9241  **  3.8516  0.0497 
CAPITAL 0.5308    2.0119  0.1561 
SIZE -1.0173  **  4.7297  0.0296 
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Table 9


































Sears Credit Account Tr 1991-C 07/11/1991 500.0 nr 8.65 na na na nr 75 77
Sears Credit Account Tr 1991-D 09/26/1991 500.0 nr 7.75 na na na nr
Sears Roebuck, 19911014
Sears Credit Account Tr 1991-D 09/26/1991 500.0 nr 7.75 na na na nr 75 411
Sears Credit Account Master Tr 11/10/1992 1000.0 0.085 5.90 na na na nr
Citibank NA(Citigroup Inc), 19910513
b,c,d
Standard Credit Card Tr 1990-7 08/20/1990 1250.0 0.170 8.88 155.0 0.060 9.13 6% LOC 49 290
Standard Credit Card Master Tr 06/06/1991 625.0 0.180 7.88 78.0 0.070 8.25 7% CCA
Citibank NA(Citigroup Inc), 19930315
e
Standard Credit Card Master Tr 09/24/1992 1250.0 0.110 3-M LIBOR+30 80.0 0.050 3-M LIBOR+62.5 5% CCA 86 336
Standard Credit Card Master Tr 08/26/1993 750.0 0.110 5.95 48.0 0.050 6.15 5% CCA
Household, 19930331
Household Credit Card Tr 1992-1 12/22/1992 357.0 0.160 1-M LIBOR+25 68.0 0.100 6.25 CCA 272 1,081
Household CC Master Tr 1995-1 12/08/1995 500.0 0.125 1-M LIBOR+17 24.3 0.090 1-M LIBOR+35 9% CIA
Household International Inc, 19951106
Private Label CC Master Tr II 1994-2 11/09/1994 307.5 0.180 7.80 22.5 0.120 6.70 12% CIA 333 2,465
Household Private Label CC 2001-1 08/09/2001 400.0 0.156 1-M LIBOR+14 58.3 0.029 1-M LIBOR+45 15.61% OC
First Chicago NBD Corp, 19960711
First Chicago Master Tr II 95-P 06/15/1995 500.0 0.140 1-M LIBOR+18 na na na
12.5%CIA / 
1% CCA 181 456




AT&T Universal Master Tr 1996-2 06/24/1996 850.0 0.156 3-M LIBOR+7 80.0 0.070 3-M LIBOR+21 7% CIA 102 317
AT&T Universal Master Tr 1996-3 09/10/1996 850.0 0.156 3-M LIBOR+10 80.0 0.070 3-M LIBOR+30 7% CIA
AT&T Universal Master Tr 1997-1 05/07/1997 850.0 0.150 3-M LIBOR+9 80.0 0.070 3-M LIBOR+28 7% CIA
BANK ONE Corp, 19970305
Banc One Cr Card Master Tr 1996-A 03/20/1996 465.0 0.170 1-W LIBOR+22 35.0 0.100 1-W LIBOR+34.5 10% CCA 168 490
First USA CC Master Tr 1997-5 07/23/1997 650.0 0.170 1-M LIBOR+14 58.7 0.095 1-M LIBOR+33 9.5% CIA
Sears Roebuck, 19980518
c
Sears Credit Account Master Tr 97-1 07/21/1997 500.0 0.115 6.20 22.5 0.070 6.40 7% CIA 108 463
Sears Credit Account Master Tr 98-1 05/19/1998 500.0 0.156 5.80 35.3 0.090 6.00 9% CIA
Sears Credit Account Master Tr 98-2 10/27/1998 450.0 0.150 5.25 32.0 0.090 6.30 9% CIA
a Prior Issue Frequency is the average time between issues for as many as the ten prior issues brought to market. For Household Private Label, we have evidence of only one deal prior to 
that we use as the "Before" deal. 
b The prior Citigroup deal immediately before the recourse event (1990-8B, Oct 11, 1990) was a single-tier deal that was not typical of prior issues. We included the next previous multi-
tier deal for comparison instead. Using this deal adds 60 days to the issuance interval between before and after. 
c The next deal went to market the day after the recourse event. We included the next deal after that for comparison. This adjustment adds 23 days to the Citi issuance interval between 
before and after, 239 days to the AT&T interval, and 161 days to the Sears issuance interval. 
d Tertiary credit support obtained from 1990-6, June 21, 1990.  
e The next Citigroup deal immediately after the recourse event (1993-1, August 4, 1993) was a single-tier deal that was not typical of prior or subsequent issues. We included the next 
multi-tier deal for comparison instead. This adjustment adds 22 days to the issuance interval between before and after. 
 
Note: Mercantile, Prudential and Tandy did not have any other comparison issues before or after the recourse event. First Union's only issues were their 1996-1 and 1996-2, both of which 
required recourse. 
 
na indicates data field is not applicable to issue.  
nr indicates we were not able to find data relating to a relevant field.
The following table contains credit card ABS deal attributes from those deals prior and subsequent to recourse events. All data are from the Securities Data Corp. New Issues 
Database. 
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Table 10
Comparison of Issue Attributes Before and After Recourse, CCISM Firms
Recourse Firm, Recourse Date and 




























Chase Manhattan Cred Tr 03/12/1991 750,000 nr 8.45% na na na nr 88 94
Chase Manhattan Cred Tr 1991-1 06/14/1991 1,000,000 11.0% 8.75% na na na 11% CCA
Sears, 9/11/1991
BNY Master Credit Card Trust 03/28/1991 750,000 13.0% 7.95% na na na 13% CCA na 175
BNY Master Credit Card Trust 09/19/1991 600,000 13.0% 7.10% na na na 13% CCA
Sears, 10/14/1991
BNY Master Credit Card Trust 09/19/1991 600,000 13.0% 7.10% na na na 13% CCA na na
na na na na na na na na
Citigroup, 3/15/1993
Chase Manhattan Credit Card Tr 02/25/1992 750,000 11.0% 7.40% na na na 11% CCA 110 1107
Chase Manhattan CC Mas Tr 95-1 03/08/1995 855,000 16.0% 1moL+0.13 50,000 11.0% 1moL+0.285 11% CCA
Household Int'l, 3/31/1993
Advanta Credit Card Master Tr 08/20/1992 250,000 50.0% 5.95% 250,000 nr private nr 230 342
Advanta Credit Card Master Tr 07/28/1993 400,000 53.0% 1moL+0.23 na na na 13% CCA
Household Int'l, 11/6/1995
Advanta Crdt Cd Mr Tr 1995-D 07/19/1995 519,000 17.5% 1moL+0.19 30,000 11.5% 1moL+0.32 11.5% CIA 178 90
Advanta Credit Card Master 11/14/1995 801,000 13.8% 6.05%
1moL+0.19
a
44,600 7.8% 1moL+0.30 5.75% CIA￿2% CCA
First Union, 6/10/1996
People's Bank CCMT 1995-1 03/21/1995 379,000 14.5% 1moL+0.20 21,000 9.0% 1moL+0.35 9% CCA 145 458
People's Bank CCMT 1996-1 06/21/1996 379,000 14.5% 1moL+0.15 21,000 9.0% 1moL+0.30 9% CCA
First Chicago, 7/11/1996
Chase Manhattan Credit 1996-3, 4
b 06/12/1996 957,200 14.0% 7% 42,800 8.0% 7% 8% CIA 215 257
Chase Manhattan CC Tr 1997-1 02/24/1997 1,150,000 16.0% 1moL+0.09 95,000 9.0% 1moL+0.29 9% CIA
AT&T Universal, 9/9/1996
Capital One Bank Series 1995-3 09/07/1995 840,000 20.0% 1moL+0.15 109,200 7.0% private 7% CIA 114 353
Capital One Master Tr 1996-2 11/25/1996 600,000 20.0% 1moL+0.10 54,000 11.0% private 11% CIA
First Union, 2/24/1997
People's Bank CCMT 1996-1 06/21/1996 379,000 14.5% 1moL+0.15 21,000 9.0% 1moL+0.30 9% CCA 458 279
People's Bank CCMT 1997-1 03/27/1997 425,000 15.0% 1moL + 0.12 33,750 8.3% 1mL + 0.32 8.25% CIA
Bank One, 3/5/1997
BA Master CC Trust 1996-A 07/15/1996 427,500 14.5% 1moL+13 32,500 8.0% 1moL+26 8% CIA na 325
BankAmerica CCMT 97A 06/05/1997 648,800 13.5% 1moL+11 41,300 8.0% 1moL+29 8% CIA
First Union, 5/19/1997
People's Bank CCMT 1997-1 03/27/1997 425,000 15.0% 1moL + 0.12 33,750 8.3% 1mL + 0.32 8.25% CIA 279 181
People's Bank CCMT 1997-2 09/24/1997 425000 15.0% 1moL + 0.13 33750 8.3% 1mL + 0.33 8.25% CIA
Sears, 5/18/1998
MBNA Master CC Trust 1997-N 11/19/1997 765,000 16.0% 3moL+7 67,500 8.0% 3moL+23 8% CIA 75 103
MBNA Master CC Trust 1998-C 06/10/1998 637,500 16.0% 1moL+8 56,250 8.0% 1moL+25 8% CIA
a Tranche is half fixed, half floating.
b Reported numbers are the average of 1996-3 and 1996-4
Mercantile and Tandy CCISM matches did not have deals with sufficient comparison data.
na indicates data field is not applicable to issue.
nr indicates we were not able to find data relating to a relevant field.
The following table contains credit card ABS deal attributes from those deals prior and subsequent to recourse events. All data are from the Securities Data Corp. New Issues Database. 
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Appendix A 
Long-run Stock Price Performance – Individual Firm Results 
 
 
The following appendix contains long-run buy and hold returns for recourse announcing firms, size and book-to-
market equity matched firms, and issue size matched firms. Returns are reported for the year before and the two 
years after a recourse announcement occurs.  
 
Panel A: Recourse announcing firms 
 
  Year relative to recourse announcement 
 -1  1  2 
Sears  0.5712 0.0765 1.0705 
Banc  One  0.3051 0.6145 0.5622 
Tandy  0.1715 0.3816 1.1716 
AT&T  0.0140 0.1434 0.5378 
First  Union  0.3897 0.6503 1.0784 
First  Chicago  0.1744 0.7685 1.3183 
Household  0.5280 -0.0721 0.4158 
Sears 0.1660  -0.2293  -0.3981 
Citigroup -0.2783  0.2510  0.7837 
Mercantile  0.2431 0.3326 1.0165 
 
Panel B: Size and book-to-market equity matched firms 
 
  Year relative to recourse announcement 
 -1  1  2 
Wal-Mart 0.8993  0.1963  -0.0429 
FleetBoston  0.4662 0.4060 0.4691 
Circuit  City  0.7686 -0.1029 0.3440 
Verizon  0.0422 0.4225 0.6507 
KeyCorp  0.3851 0.5408 0.9250 
BankBoston  0.2762 0.5659 1.1517 
Beneficial  0.1303 0.0889 0.2505 
JC Penny  0.4722  -0.2543  -0.7307 
Bank  of  America 0.3483 0.2536 0.1901 
Compass  0.2000 0.4285 1.2610 
 
Panel C: Issue size matched firms 
 
  Year relative to recourse announcement 
 -1  1  2 
Bank of New York  0.4195  0.3920  0.7943 
Bank  of  America 0.6216 0.5354 0.3431 
Charming  Shoppes  -0.1515 -0.3153 -0.6284 
Capital  One  0.1130 0.4082 2.7069 
Peoples  Bank  0.4111 0.7847 1.4987 
Chase  0.3864 0.6194 1.2917 
Advanta  0.7338 0.3131 0.4146 
MBNA  0.6877 0.3333 0.3611 
Chase -0.1911  0.6732  0.7797 
National  City  Corp.  0.2508 0.5210 1.0269 
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Appendix B 
Financial Performance Ratios – Individual Firm Results 
 
 
The following appendix contains financial performance ratios for recourse announcing firms, size and book-to-
market equity matched firms, and issue size matched firms. Ratios are reported for the two years before, the two 
years after and in the year in which a recourse announcement occurs.  
 
Panel A: Financial performance two years prior to recourse announcement 
 
Recourse announcing firms 







Return on Equity 
Sears 0.0561  0.0280  0.0173  0.0907  0.1107 
Banc One  0.0357  0.1424  0.0141  0.3601  0.1608 
Tandy 0.1761  0.0420  0.0635  0.1164  0.1062 
AT&T 0.1657  0.0627  0.0594  0.1749  0.2628 
First Union  0.0303  0.1414  0.0114  0.3740  0.1638 
First Chicago  0.0253  0.1536  0.0113  0.3440  0.1615 
Household 0.0554  0.0326  0.0050  0.3618  0.0982 
Sears 0.1154  0.0332  0.0351  0.1091  0.2570 
Citigroup 0.0294  0.0131  0.0022  0.1784  0.0605 
Mercantile 0.0315  0.1574  0.0132  0.3765  0.1507 
 
Size and book-to-market equity matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Wal-Mart 0.2418  0.0405  0.1316  0.0745  0.2783 
FleetBoston 0.0339  0.0775  0.0072  0.3634  0.1022 
Circuit City  0.1514  0.0013  0.0036  0.0559  0.0086 
Verizon 0.2291  -0.0547  -0.0311  0.4032  -0.1241 
KeyCorp 0.0302  0.1589  0.0128  0.3752  0.1881 
BankBoston 0.0275  0.0958  0.0098  0.2697  0.1653 
Beneficial 0.0980  0.0822  0.0149  0.5401  0.1310 
JC Penny  0.1163  0.0380  0.0490  0.0902  0.1521 
Bank of America  0.0241  0.0968  0.0112  0.2087  0.2249 
Compass 0.0261  0.1503  0.0109  0.3591  0.1659 
 
Issue size matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Bank of New York  0.0085  0.0092  0.0010  0.0751  0.0214 
Bank of America  0.0256  0.1194  0.0104  0.2933  0.1528 
Charming Shoppes  0.1516  0.0455  0.0768  0.0898  0.1348 
Capital One  0.0981  0.1453  0.0308  0.4626  0.2007 
Peoples Bank  0.0255  0.1346  0.0108  0.3179  0.1608 
Chase 0.0273  0.1077  0.0106  0.2787  0.1732 
Advanta 0.0369  0.0832  0.0147  0.2093  0.2135 
MBNA 0.0858  0.1447  0.0279  0.4455  0.2784 
Chase 0.0068  -0.0478  -0.0062  0.0529  -0.1621 
National City Corp.  0.0369  0.1478  0.0134  0.4074  0.1779 
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Panel B: Financial performance one year prior to recourse announcement 
 
Recourse announcing firms 







Return on Equity 
Sears 0.0433  0.0161  0.0094  0.0744  0.0704 
Banc One  0.0357  0.1389  0.0140  0.3536  0.1690 
Tandy 0.1353  0.0388  0.0581  0.0903  0.1237 
AT&T 0.1682  0.0017  0.0016  0.1878  0.0080 
First Union  0.0279  0.1351  0.0108  0.3474  0.1614 
First Chicago  0.0256  0.1077  0.0094  0.2921  0.1445 
Household 0.0453  0.0457  0.0061  0.3376  0.1187 
Sears 0.1199  0.0288  0.0307  0.1124  0.2027 
Citigroup 0.0312  0.0119  0.0021  0.1762  0.0559 
Mercantile 0.0296  0.1551  0.0136  0.3378  0.1508 
 
Size and book-to-market equity matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Wal-Mart 0.2367  0.0417  0.1312  0.0752  0.2713 
FleetBoston 0.0378  0.1416  0.0133  0.4021  0.1763 
Circuit City  0.1689  0.0280  0.0783  0.0605  0.1746 
Verizon 0.2369  0.1384  0.0769  0.4262  0.2780 
KeyCorp 0.0299  0.1363  0.0124  0.3271  0.1652 
BankBoston 0.0289  0.1014  0.0114  0.2568  0.1668 
Beneficial 0.0816  0.0249  0.0040  0.5123  0.0415 
JC Penny  0.0907  0.0233  0.0256  0.0825  0.1022 
Bank of America  0.0221  0.0905  0.0101  0.1987  0.1920 
Compass 0.0264  0.1299  0.0107  0.3187  0.1560 
 
Issue size matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Bank of New York  0.0195  0.0578  0.0068  0.1662  0.1238 
Bank of America  0.0309  0.1356  0.0128  0.3274  0.1748 
Charming Shoppes  0.1710  0.0571  0.0915  0.1068  0.1610 
Capital One  0.0906  0.1252  0.0266  0.4265  0.2111 
Peoples Bank  0.0280  0.1168  0.0103  0.3165  0.1330 
Chase 0.0158  0.1126  0.0098  0.1825  0.1633 
Advanta 0.0537  0.1405  0.0271  0.2791  0.2763 
MBNA 0.0948  0.1376  0.0292  0.4463  0.3160 
Chase 0.0135  -0.0244  -0.0034  0.0971  -0.0859 
National City Corp.  0.0350  0.1348  0.0128  0.3670  0.1700 
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Panel C: Financial performance in the year of a recourse announcement 
 
Recourse announcing firms 







Return on Equity 
Sears 0.0431  0.0223  0.0120  0.0801  0.0923 
Banc One  0.0418  0.0988  0.0113  0.3667  0.1275 
Tandy 0.1355  0.0233  0.0301  0.1049  0.0649 
AT&T 0.2150  0.1132  0.1064  0.2288  0.2911 
First Union  0.0286  0.1251  0.0107  0.3349  0.1498 
First Chicago  0.0310  0.1419  0.0137  0.3203  0.1677 
Household 0.0462  0.0671  0.0091  0.3417  0.1437 
Sears 0.1193  0.0254  0.0280  0.1079  0.1728 
Citigroup 0.0279  -0.0144  -0.0021  0.1900  -0.0622 
Mercantile 0.0274  0.1184  0.0101  0.3211  0.1175 
 
Size and book-to-market equity matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Wal-Mart 0.2010  0.0396  0.1134  0.0702  0.2406 
FleetBoston 0.0398  0.1610  0.0152  0.4206  0.1774 
Circuit City  0.1748  0.0337  0.0873  0.0675  0.1916 
Verizon 0.2229  0.1438  0.0757  0.4235  0.2535 
KeyCorp 0.0301  0.1297  0.0116  0.3374  0.1604 
BankBoston 0.0310  0.1042  0.0104  0.3101  0.1469 
Beneficial 0.0766  0.0936  0.0142  0.5053  0.1530 
JC Penny  0.1063  0.0181  0.0241  0.0800  0.0823 
Bank of America  0.0264  0.0916  0.0097  0.2488  0.1668 
Compass 0.0267  0.1322  0.0109  0.3231  0.1605 
 
Issue size matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Bank of New York  0.0162  0.0289  0.0031  0.1515  0.0487 
Bank of America  0.0279  0.1416  0.0116  0.3392  0.1446 
Charming Shoppes  0.1933  0.0688  0.1100  0.1209  0.1822 
Capital One  0.0818  0.1090  0.0240  0.3716  0.2097 
Peoples Bank  0.0252  0.1220  0.0105  0.2934  0.1296 
Chase 0.0113  0.1237  0.0073  0.1915  0.1345 
Advanta 0.0630  0.2056  0.0372  0.3480  0.2331 
MBNA 0.0891  0.1494  0.0301  0.4426  0.3247 
Chase 0.0194  0.0439  0.0053  0.1606  0.1214 
National City Corp.  0.0369  0.1495  0.0145  0.3811  0.1662 
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Panel D: Financial performance one year after a recourse announcement 
 
Recourse announcing firms 







Return on Equity 
Sears 0.0288  -0.0751  -0.0471  0.0460  -0.4269 
Banc One  0.0383  0.1214  0.0119  0.3910  0.1526 
Tandy 0.1357  0.0450  0.0692  0.0882  0.1623 
AT&T 0.1841  0.0907  0.0791  0.2111  0.2048 
First Union  0.0296  0.1323  0.0121  0.3251  0.1576 
First Chicago  0.0297  0.1510  0.0134  0.3355  0.1963 
Household 0.0496  0.0799  0.0107  0.3698  0.1671 
Sears 0.1237  0.0354  0.0393  0.1113  0.2108 
Citigroup 0.0319  0.0226  0.0034  0.2137  0.0906 
Mercantile 0.0229  0.0907  0.0068  0.3041  0.0849 
 
Size and book-to-market equity matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Wal-Mart 0.1871  0.0367  0.1042  0.0658  0.2301 
FleetBoston 0.0393  0.1532  0.0147  0.4103  0.1757 
Circuit City  0.1729  0.0321  0.0852  0.0651  0.1864 
Verizon 0.2397  0.0808  0.0455  0.4259  0.1920 
KeyCorp 0.0299  0.1399  0.0125  0.3350  0.1774 
BankBoston 0.0312  0.1307  0.0127  0.3215  0.2029 
Beneficial 0.0750  0.0831  0.0124  0.5047  0.1382 
JC Penny  0.0912  0.0189  0.0251  0.0687  0.0887 
Bank of America  0.0290  0.0978  0.0083  0.3435  0.1193 
Compass 0.0270  0.1376  0.0116  0.3216  0.1620 
 
Issue size matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Bank of New York  0.0251  0.1030  0.0090  0.2864  0.1185 
Bank of America  0.0261  0.0997  0.0084  0.3113  0.1125 
Charming Shoppes  0.1705  0.0636  0.0962  0.1127  0.1528 
Capital One  0.0911  0.1060  0.0268  0.3609  0.2120 
Peoples Bank  0.0326  0.1193  0.0113  0.3445  0.1303 
Chase 0.0162  0.1697  0.0101  0.2705  0.1854 
Advanta 0.0595  0.2014  0.0341  0.3519  0.2407 
MBNA 0.1025  0.1583  0.0332  0.4889  0.2439 
Chase 0.0227  0.0574  0.0067  0.1960  0.1269 
National City Corp.  0.0350  0.1567  0.0148  0.3715  0.1886 
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Panel E: Financial performance two years after a recourse announcement 
 
Recourse announcing firms 







Return on Equity 
Sears 0.0397  0.0467  0.0261  0.0709  0.2350 
Banc One  0.0380  0.1365  0.0130  0.3990  0.1757 
Tandy 0.1634  0.0362  0.0778  0.0759  0.1361 
AT&T 0.2510  0.1202  0.1074  0.2809  0.2507 
First Union  0.0320  0.1342  0.0122  0.3531  0.1683 
First Chicago  Data for First Chicago not available 
Household 0.0757  0.0881  0.0155  0.4299  0.1684 
Sears 0.1223  0.0328  0.0364  0.1102  0.1984 
Citigroup 0.0398  0.0689  0.0102  0.2680  0.2204 
Mercantile 0.0264  0.1279  0.0105  0.3226  0.1221 
 
Size and book-to-market equity matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Wal-Mart 0.1758  0.0360  0.0970  0.0652  0.2277 
FleetBoston 0.0370  0.1020  0.0107  0.3530  0.1394 
Circuit City  0.1724  0.0301  0.0838  0.0619  0.1913 
Verizon 0.2517  0.0939  0.0538  0.4397  0.2276 
KeyCorp 0.0295  0.1403  0.0124  0.3324  0.1615 
BankBoston  Data for First Chicago not available 
Beneficial 0.0733  0.0628  0.0096  0.4801  0.1084 
JC Penny  0.0805  0.0103  0.0161  0.0517  0.0495 
Bank of America  0.0329  0.1229  0.0105  0.3873  0.1379 
Compass 0.0254  0.1333  0.0105  0.3241  0.1549 
 
Issue size matched firms 







Return on Equity 
Bank of New York  0.0312  0.1472  0.0123  0.3744  0.1480 
Bank of America  0.0290  0.1530  0.0125  0.3559  0.1777 
Charming Shoppes  0.1166  0.0351  0.0532  0.0770  0.0800 
Capital One  0.0965  0.1059  0.0292  0.3498  0.2166 
Peoples Bank  0.0331  0.1015  0.0092  0.3632  0.1076 
Chase  Data for First Chicago not available 
Advanta 0.0546  0.1916  0.0302  0.3466  0.2034 
MBNA 0.1013  0.1668  0.0339  0.4978  0.1981 
Chase 0.0239  0.0848  0.0095  0.2145  0.1437 
National City Corp.  0.0342  0.1327  0.0121  0.3735  0.1535 
 
 
a Sales is Compustat item 12, Sales-Net, the same item number used by Loughran and Ritter (1997). For banks, this 
item includes total current operating revenue and net pretax profit or loss on securities sold or redeemed. 
 
 
 
 